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Abstract 
 
The role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as independent agents, aspiring to participate in 
shaping official policies and the decision-making process, has continued to grow in the recent 
decades. In order to maintain themselves and actively operate on the issue areas, they turn to 
different sources of funding, the effects of which has created a certain degree of dispute in the 
academia. In particular, funding from national government institutions has raised concerns. It 
is discussed that in some sectors the civil society has not received enough financial support 
from government that it deserves in a democratic society, while simultaneously organizations 
in other policy fields seek to avoid close cooperation with government to preserve their voice 
in criticizing the official policy. What determines the difference between policy sectors, that 
make some CSOs secure government funding and rely on it heavily, while others publicly 
proclaim their financial independence from national institutions?  
 
This research examines theoretical claims that it is CSOs’ utility to the donors and the level of 
sensitivity of the sector that shape how reliant a CSO might be in a given sector. It contributes 
to further theory-development by placing government as CSOs’ donor in focus. In doing so, 
this thesis assumes that the level of democracy in the country and its performance in a given 
sector define the sensitivity of a given policy sector from the government perspective, which, 
in turn, affects the likelihood of CSOs receiving government funding. The empirical part of 
the research applying multiple OLS regression tests these claims using the European 
Transparency Register, the only publicly open database that contains detailed information on 
CSOs’ funding volumes and sources. The analyses show that the level of democracy and a 
country’s performance in the policy sector shape the sensitivity of the sector from government 
perspective and, together with CSO’s utility, impact the extent to which they receive funding 
from government.  
 
Key words: civil society; civil society organizations; CSOs; government funding; policy 
sectors; policy fields 
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Introduction 
Enhancing civil society participation in international governance has attracted a considerable 
amount of scholarly interest. First considered to be efficient subcontractors of public services 
provision, civil society organizations (CSOs) rapidly grew in quantity both in the western 
countries and developing parts of the world, then transforming into (or at least aspiring to be) 
independent grassroots agents with the high level of expertise in their specific issue areas. 
 
While the role of CSOs as independent agents representing the needs of specific communities 
is growing, the issue of their funding sources and its impact on their performance remains 
open. National governments are a primary source of funding for CSOs, a phenomenon which 
is fraught with tensions and tradeoffs for both civil society and government. Sceptics claim 
that as governments may deem CSOs a threat to governmental authority, they can 
significantly undermine CSOs autonomy through financing. At the same time, others insist 
that governmental funds might actually foster CSOs performance, and while some 
organizations, such as the Amnesty International, publicly declare their financial 
independence from state, others persist in seeking closer collaboration with their national 
government institutions. Given that stronger democracies are supposed to promote and 
support civil society, which in reality is not always the case, what exactly determines 
government incentives to establish more profound cooperation with CSOs and to financially 
support their activity?  
 
Some scholars made an attempt to address this issue by examining what determines CSOs 
aspiration and ability to secure government funding in different policy sectors. It has been 
claimed that environmental CSOs and organizations, engaging in political activity, tend to 
abstain from government funding in order to preserve their autonomy and ability to criticize 
the official policy (Ebrahim, 2003; Ostrander et al., 2005; Child and Gronbjerg, 2007). In 
contrast, humanitarian and health organizations are perceived as avoiding confrontation with 
government and even heavily relying on it in order to maintain themselves financially and 
conduct their costly operations in the developing countries (Mosley, 2011). It has thus been 
articulated that in different policy sectors CSOs reliance on government funding differs 
considerably, however, the academic literature has so far lacked the comprehensive 
examination of the role of policy sectors and their effect on the government share of CSOs 
funding. 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
In order to address this gap, this research turns to the theory that conceptualizes policy sectors 
by deriving two factors that define them and affect the level of cooperation that donors might 
seek with the civil society: CSO’s utility to donors and the sensitivity of the sector from 
donors’ perspective. According to this theory, donors decide whether to establish close 
partnership with and provide funding to CSOs, based on how useful their expertise might be 
in the given sector and whether donors are willing to concede their dominance in the sector 
and expose themselves to the critique from the civil society. The theory suggests a framework 
to assess CSOs’ utility and the sensitivity of the sector.  
  
While this theory derives conclusions by observing the cooperation between CSOs and 
international organizations, this research, on the other hand, aspires to expand this theoretical 
framework by placing the focus on the interplay between CSOs and government. While the 
model that assesses CSOs’ utility to donors is highly plausible, the sensitivity of the sector 
will vary from government to government and needs to be addressed separately. This research 
contributes to further theory-development by examining what factors make a policy sector 
particularly sensitive to governments and how the amount of government funding to CSOs 
varies in the sectors with different levels of sensitivity. 
 
Based on the previous literature and theoretical framework, this thesis makes an assumption 
that the level of democracy and country’s performance in a given sector determines the level 
of sensitivity of an issue area. I propose a model that allows me to assess the likelihood of 
CSOs reliance on government funding, based on the CSOs’ utility to government in the sector 
and the level of its sensitivity. Finally, I test the proposed model by conducting an empirical 
analysis, examining whether the level of democracy and country’s performance in a given 
sector affect the government share of funding in CSOs budgets.  
 
The research attempts to answer the following question: how can the sensitivity of the policy 
field that a CSO is active in be assessed from government perspective and what affect does it 
produce on CSOs government share of funding? The aim of this research is thus to examine 
whether certain factors affect the sensitivity of a policy field and thus produce an impact on 
CSOs government share of funding. The paper seeks to reach this goal by drawing on the data 
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from the European Transparency register, which currently provides the fullest database on the 
NGOs activity, financial sources and relationship with other actors.  
 
By addressing the gap in the previous discussions, where the impact of policy sectors on the 
structure of CSOs funding has been overseen, the thesis contributes to a more profound 
understanding of the interplay between the civil society and government within different 
sectors across various national settings. It seeks to explain the CSOs ability to secure 
government funding and reveal the factors that make government show greater willingness to 
provide funding to CSOs in one sector, while abstaining from the cooperation with them in 
the other.  
 
According to the findings of this thesis, a country’s performance on democracy and in policy 
issue contributes to the sensitivity of certain policy sectors and thus affect CSOs government 
funding share. Environmental and human rights organizations in strong democracies are more 
reliant on government funding, while in security and finance sectors governments are 
generally significantly less inclined to provide funding to civil society. Finally, in 
humanitarian aid and youth sectors CSOs’ government funding share is more considerable, 
regardless of its countries performance.  
 
The thesis proceeds as follows: after defining the principal features of civil society, the 
previous research on the interplay between government and civil society organizations, as 
well as the effects that government funding produces on their relation, is addressed. Then, the 
theoretical framework that explains the nature of that interplay with regard to different policy 
sectors is discussed, followed by the analytical framework, in which the sector-assessment 
model is defined, out of which a hypothesis is developed. After that, I elaborate on the 
research design, analytical strategy and the choice of variables, before presenting the results 
of regression analyses. In conclusion, the limitations of this study and possibilities for future 
research are discussed. 
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Literature review  
This section addresses the previous research on defining civil society, the interplay between 
government and civil society organizations, the patterns in allocating government funding to 
CSOs, and the effect it produces on the CSOs’ performance.  
 
CSOs: concept definition 
There is a rich variety of definitions and meanings of “civil society”, however, some common 
features derived from the literature define civil society as a sector that exists between other 
established or basic social institutions (Muukkonen, 2009) or, in other words, as a realm 
between the state and the private sector (Godsäter, 2013). Najam (2000) metaphorically 
illustrates the institutional landscape as three distinct sets of organizations – the prince, the 
merchant and the citizen. The former – the prince – implies the state sector, that represents the 
interests of the dominant groups through its legitimate authority and functions within the 
political system. The second set of organizations – the merchant representing the market 
sector – is concerned with the production of goods and services and operates in terms of 
economic exchange and profit maximization. The third set – the “voluntary associational 
sector” (or civil society, in other words) – aims to implement certain social aspirations. It 
achieves this goal through the shared values of its patrons, members, and clients; it represents 
the voice of those who consider their interests marginalized.  
 
Civil society might include a rich variety of actors such as NGOs, networks, community-
based organizations, interest groups, trade unions, social movements, faith-based 
organizations, academic institutions, clan and kinship circles, lobby groups, youth 
associations and business organizations (Godsäter, 2013). It is important to highlight that in 
the scope of this research, due to the specificity of the database we work with, in the empirical 
analysis we are limited to NGOs. However, we address the literature on CSOs on a broader 
scale, as “civil society organization” is a broad term, encompassing all the organizations and 
associations that exist outside of the state and the market (Carothers, 1999), NGOs included. 
Thus, I acknowledge that these two definitions are not fully interchangeable but try to address 
the broader scope of all CSOs whenever possible.  
 
Vakil (1997) defines CSOs functions, depending on their orientation, referring to the type of 
activities they engage in. First, service providers are the organizations that act as 
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intermediaries in delivering various types of social services to other organizations, or directly 
to people. Secondly, an advocacy orientation applies to those organizations that aim to 
influence policy or decision-making related to particular issues. Thirdly, development 
organizations work to support the capacity of local communities in the developing countries 
to provide for their own basic needs. Finally, research orientation implies the goal to conduct 
research on specific topics and reveal results to various stakeholders.  
 
Having been a quite old concept, probably predating government in both form and function 
(Hodgkinson, 1989), civil society organizations re-emerged as important political actors in the 
late 1980s – the beginning of 1990s and since then has moved to the centre of the 
international stage in the last thirty years (Muukkonen, 2009; Edwards 2009). This 
development can be explained by a number of reasons. For example, scholars point out the 
fall of communism leading to a democratization of society in the former East, the popular 
uprisings against dictatorial states in Latin America (Edwards, 2009) or the establishment of 
the New Policy Agenda in the social, political and economic relations in the West (Clayton et 
al., 2000). The latter is considered to create the idea of subcontracting public services to civil 
society organizations, which eventually dominated the political discourse. The new policy 
promoted favoring CSOs over centralized government powers, which fostered the increase in 
their number all over the world (Fisher, 1993; Edwards and Hulme, 1996).  
 
The reasons to believe that CSOs provide public services and represent the population in need 
in a more effective way derive from their “grassroots” nature and the lack of commercial 
motives. Thus, for example, CSOs tend to deal directly with local target groups (Riddell, 
1995), are not likely to be distracted by commercial interests (Nancy and Yontcheva, 2006), 
and have higher expertise in working in difficult environments (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; 
Koch, 2007). CSOs have been argued to contribute to democratic citizen participation by 
informing the citizens and give voice to the communities in need (Reimann, 2006; Beyers and 
Kerremans, 2007; Greenwood, 2007; Mahoney, 2008; Mahoney and Beckstrand, 2011). Due 
to their proximity to the grassroots and advocacy for those issues that government fails to 
recognize or resolve (The World Bank, 1995; Woods, 2000), CSOs serve as a vital partner to 
the government, contributing their expertise and experience (Boris and Krehely, 2002; Berry, 
2003).  
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The interplay between government and CSOs 
As we have observed, there are many incentives for the fruitful coexistence of civil society 
and government. In a well-functioning democracy, the government should not interfere with 
CSOs activity. However, in practice, far from all countries are democratic and far from all 
democracies are strong enough to allow for profound civil society participation, especially 
regarding ambiguous and controversial sectors such as political opposition or finances. In 
theory, there are two implications for the conflict of interest to arise.  
 
The first implication lies in the fact that despite different frameworks and concepts, that 
define CSOs, one feature remains unchanged: the clear distinction of the civil society sector 
from the government (Scholte 2002; Söderbaum 2007). Najam (2000) goes so far as to claim 
that the contraposition (or the “necessary tension”, as the author calls it) between these two 
actors is so natural, that if it disappears, “it would mean only that at least one of the two has 
ceased to be what it essentially is”. As they operate in the same policy, it is inevitable that at 
some point their interests, priorities or goals are going to collide. 
 
The second implication for the conflict would be the resource-dependence theory. According 
to it, government’s power over CSOs is equal to CSOs dependence on governments 
resources, which might be expressed as funds, expertise, information or the ability to 
influence the decision-making process (Hillman et al., 2009). CSOs, not being able to 
generate themselves all the resources that they need for their existence and meaningful 
activity turn to cooperation with other actors, including governments (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 
1976). In exchange for the promise of the undisrupted access to the needed resources 
governments theoretically have power to monitor, influence and regulate CSOs activity, 
which they often resort to (Ruggiano and Taliaferro, 2012).  
 
Combined, these two implications create a foundation for the conflict between governments 
and CSOs. It tends to lead to the situation where governments hold positions compatible with 
some civil society groups and even collaborate with them. But eventually, as governments 
find themselves criticized and challenged by CSOs, they oppose these organizations and gain 
by denying them access and influence (Beyers et al., 2008).  
 
Hence, many governments are likely to discriminate among CSOs and try to regulate and 
influence their activity. We define two mechanisms through which governments might 
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exercise the excessive power and limit NGOs role as independent actors in democratic citizen 
participation.  
 
Legislation as a tool of CSOs regulation 
The first mechanism that government might use to control NGOs is a restrictive legislative 
regulation. Legal rules might suppress NGOs political activity and put their existence into 
question. Governments may wish to enforce registration and monitoring mechanisms in order 
to keep track of NGOs activities to ensure quality and accountability (Gilson et al., 1994, 
Green and Matthias, 1997). Governments may also desire to regulate or restrict NGOs, when 
they are afraid that NGO activity could challenge state ideology (Hulme and Edwards, 1997; 
Wiktorowicz, 2002). 
 
Examples of that might be found throughout the world. For instance, Chavez (2004) explains 
that in the U.S. there are legal limits on the extent to which non-profits may engage in 
political activity. It is completely prohibited for non-governmental organizations to express 
their support or opposition to candidates running for office, while lobbying is permitted to 
NGOs as long as it does not constitute a “substantial” part of their activities. In Bangladesh, 
NGOs emergence has been considered as a threat to government hegemony and the legislative 
response was explicitly regulatory, while in Vietnam non-profits are mostly headed by 
Communist Party members and are required to have a government counterpart, which makes 
opposing political activity impossible (Mayhew, 2005). 
 
Venezuelan national assembly passed a law in 2010 that prohibits foreign funding for NGOs 
and political parties, which made many human-rights groups fully dependent on limited 
domestic donations and thus drove many of them to shut down1. The opposition to Hugo 
Chavez government claimed that the law “criminalised and persecuted the democratic 
opposition”2 but was unable to counteract. Meanwhile, Russia also requires NGOs to report 
political activities and receipts of foreign money (Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow, 2014; 
Dupuy, 2016). Moreover, the so called “foreign agent” law requires non-profit organizations 
                                                     
1 The BBC, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2010/12/101216_venezuela_ley_partidos_ong_financiamiento 
2 The Guardian, 2010. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/22/venezuela-
chavez-ngo-foreign-funding 
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that receive foreign donations and engage in “political activity” to register and declare 
themselves as foreign agents, which leads to their stigmatization in the political community.  
 
In 2016 Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, passed a law that forces human rights groups that 
receive more than half their funding from abroad to disclose it prominently in official 
reports3. The law requires groups to declare they are reliant on foreign funding in all dealings 
with officials, and on TV, newspapers, billboards and online. This selective law, that leaves 
out right-wing pro-settlement NGOs, aims at non-profits, campaigning for Palestinian rights, 
and is argued to cast a shadow and stigmatize them in the society.  
 
Thus, strict legislative regulations are a widely-practised tool for governments to control and 
influence NGOs, limiting or eliminating their autonomy and independence. 
 
The effect of funding on CSOs performance 
The second possible governmental mechanism to constrain or control CSOs is funding, 
although it is quite ambiguous, as the literature points out.  
 
CSOs might aspire to seek governmental funding in the search of an extensive and relatively 
steady source of funding, as compared to membership fees, public proceeds or donations. 
Some argue that state financial support and thus the perceived proximity of an NGO to 
government might grant this NGO more credibility (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; 
Pallas and Uhlin, 2014). CSOs can also use government funding to build capacity to collect 
information and summon expertise (Leech, 2006; Ruggiano and Taliaferro, 2012). If CSOs’ 
agenda and state official policy are aligned, the relationship between government and civil 
society becomes symbiotic. Government funds act as reinforcement for organization’s 
political activity, as government takes upon itself a large part of expenditures on promoting 
and resolving the issue. In this case, CSOs are released from the necessity to extend their 
expenditures on lobbying, thus making their financial foundation more sustainable 
(Viravaidya, 2001; Davis, 2015).  
 
                                                     
3 The Guardian, 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/israel-passes-
law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding 
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Moreover, Lecy and Van Slyke (2013) claim that government funds seem to lead to the surge 
in the number of non-profit organizations, whereas private funds do not produce any 
significant impact on their density. They have examined different funding sources of human 
services nonprofit organizations in the U.S. and arrived at the conclusion that it is government 
funding in the form of grants and contracts that appears to have the most substantial effect on 
the growth rate of nonprofits. They find that an increase of roughly $5 million in 
governmental support has the effect of increasing the number of human services nonprofits by 
one additional organization. Meanwhile, it needs five times as many private funds to promote 
establishment of one NGO. To conclude, based on their empirical test, government funds 
might promote the establishment of new CSOs and their reinforcement.  
 
Another group of scholars have found no evidence to the government interference with CSOs 
activity, if these organizations are state funded. For instance, Chaves et al. (2004) examined 
this relationship using two data sets: a national sample of religious congregations and a 
longitudinal sample of human services non-profit organizations in Minneapolis - St. Paul. 
They aimed to observe covariance between the government funding that faith-based 
organizations receive and the amount of political activity they exercise. This political activity 
is measured by whether the congregation had a group meeting to organize a demonstration or 
discuss politics and whether people at worship services have been told about the opportunities 
to participate in campaigns petitioning or lobbying. According to the results of their research, 
government funding does not suppress non-profit political activity. In fact, those 
congregations that received government funds were more likely to engage in lobbying activity 
than those who did not have public support.  
 
The similar conclusion is drawn by Child and Gronbjerg (2007) that conducted a large survey 
of Indiana non-profit organizations and compared non-profits with intensive involvement in 
advocacy to those who do not exercise advocacy at all. They revealed that organizations’ 
reliance on government funding do not generally help differentiate non-profits that advocate 
from those that do not, in contrast to the size of organization, its access to information and the 
field of activity. Although the authors mention that when government funding constitutes 
more than one half of organization’s revenues, its odds of participating in advocacy decrease 
by 70%, they refrain from making a causal argument and do not include the government share 
of total funding as the factor that could affect organization’s advocacy.  
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However, we find arguable limitations of these research. First, it has only focused on the non-
profit organizations located in the U.S. It is a significant factor that might hinder 
generalization of their results, as national context (restrictiveness of national regulations) is 
considered to play an important role in the degree of non-profits political activity and largely 
vary in different regions (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire, 2017). Secondly, this research 
group has only focused its attention on whether government funds decrease the volume of 
CSOs’ advocacy practice or not. Types of advocacy, the reasons for its volume fluctuation, 
the difference in advocacy expenditures across different policy sectors was briefly mentioned 
but was left uncovered due to data limitations. Finally, this literature group took into 
consideration those non-profits that do not have advocacy or political activity as their primary 
goal, which significantly complicates generalization of the conclusions and lead to a certain 
degree of results distortion. 
 
Another group of scholars adheres to the opposite argument, claiming that donors may 
negatively influence the ability of nonprofit organizations to advocate and therefore create a 
threat to their autonomy, undermining their core ability to act as independent actors.  
 
Donors can interfere in NGOs’ activity via threats to withdraw funding should the 
organizations agenda become too radical. Resource dependence theory states that 
governments can control organizations by managing access to vital resources (Ruggiano and 
Taliaferro, 2012). If NGOs do not abide with the rules, defined by donors, they are likely to 
cease to exist (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Mitchell, 2012). In return for regular financial 
support, government expects compliance with its ideology and official policy and perceives 
NGOs as subcontractors, called to deliver social services on behalf of state (Sanchez Salgado, 
2010; Neumayr et al., 2015). Thus, there is evidence to believe that government funding is 
likely to reduce NGOs’ independent political activity.  
 
Some scholars voice concerns that even if governmental funds do not suppress advocacy per 
se, it might hypothetically change its nature. A group of scholars have constructed theoretical 
frameworks to explain this pattern. Mosley (2011) stated that those organizations that receive 
governmental funds tend to focus primarily on brokering resources and promoting the 
organization rather than on substantive policy. Moreover, the author later added that to be 
perceived as a partner and to ensure continuing funding these organizations abide to reject 
confrontational methods of advocacy (Mosley, 2012). These reasons constitute an evidence to 
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the fact that governmental funds might weaken CSOs’ incentives and reduce their activity to 
operational work, rather than policy influencing.  
 
This conclusion is supported by a quantitative research, that reveals the dampening effect of 
government funding on NGO lobbying. The statistical evidence to the hypothesis that 
government share in NGO funding is negatively associated with lobbying expenditure seems 
to have been revealed (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire, 2016). According to it, the more 
money nonprofit organizations get from the government, the less they spend on lobbying. The 
authors state that it might serve as a signal to the alarming tendency of NGOs to avoid 
confrontational advocacy if their agenda does not coincide with the official one. Finally, it is 
likely that CSOs tend to self-select their financial sources based on ideology and goals in 
order to avoid confrontation and external influence (Beyers et al., 2008).  
 
Two limitations can be derived from the extensive literature review. Firstly, the largest part of 
the research on this subject has been conducted qualitatively with rear exception, due to the 
complexity of the subject and the lack of measurable data on it until recently. Secondly, the 
aggregation of all CSOs in the previous research, with no distinction of their sector, size or 
national context of the countries they are based in, distorts the outcome. This research aims to 
address these limitations and complete the existing findings with the more nuanced look on 
CSOs funding, sectors where they perform and national context of their countries. 
 
To sum up, this study examined scholars’ findings on the CSOs relations with government 
and the effects of their funding on organizations’ activity. While no unanimous consent can 
be found in the literature, an alarming tendency can be summarized. The effect of government 
funding might result in the loss of autonomy by CSOs. Whether they cease to exist, transform 
their advocacy or reduce lobbying expenditures, they are incentivized to do so because they 
might lose their autonomy as soon as they receive funds from government, that through 
financial support is likely to express its influence on CSOs. It might undermine the very 
nature of civil society, which explains why the question of this research is important to 
address. 
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Theoretical framework 
This section seeks to address the encompassing theoretical frameworks, that would explain 
the incentives for the CSOs – government cooperation and how this partnership might be 
affected by the funding allocated to CSOs.    
 
Interorganizational theory 
To understand the complex nature of interaction between CSOs and government, it is 
necessary to examine why this cooperation emerges in the first place. A starting point for 
incentives of their partnership could be found in theories of cooperation from organizational 
sociology, in particular the research on interorganizational relations. “Organizational 
exchange is any voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual 
or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals and objectives” (Levine and White, 
1961). The idea behind this theory is that organizations trade some resources for their mutual 
benefit. The exchanges resources might imply material benefits, such as money transfers or 
stuff exchange, or immaterial resources, for example insider information.  
 
The nuanced nature of this exchange is further developed by the resource-dependency model, 
which claims that organizations are not able to internally generate all the resources that they 
need to maintain themselves (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). As a result, they strive to acquire 
and sustain resources from the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The 
resource dependence theory is based on three principals. First, any organization needs 
resources to survive and pursue its goals; second, an organization can obtain resources from 
other actors; and third, power and its inverse, dependence, play key roles in understanding 
interorganizational relations (Cho and Gillespie, 2006; Malatesta and Smith, 2014). The last 
principle implies that the balance of power usually favors the resource providers (in our case, 
government) and consequently results in needing organizations (CSO) becoming constrained 
and limited in their activity.  
 
The concept of policy sectors assessment  
Building on this classical model of interorganizational relations, Steffek (2010) went even 
further while studying the interaction between international organizations and NGOs and 
developed a model of the “policy cycle”. According to this model, an organization is willing 
to grant access to other actors whenever it perceives a need for resources that these actors can 
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provide, considering the precondition that other actors are willing and able to offer the 
requested resources. On the contrary, in case an organization prefers to act independently and 
retain its dominance in a certain sphere, it leaves other actors out of the discussion. The author 
of this theory underlines that the most important role in determining whether an organization 
is going to seek cooperation with others or not is played by a policy field that it is acting in.  
 
This research aims to apply this theory to the government-CSOs funding relationship. Thus, 
the theoretical model dictates that government will be willing to fund CSOs in those policy 
spheres, where it feels a need for CSOs resources (e.g. expertise or personnel), while leaving 
CSO without financial support in those policy sectors where it aspires to retain its dominance. 
In the following section I address theoretical implications, regarding what policy sectors 
should be deemed the most sensitive to government authority and where government is likely 
to need CSOs the most.   
 
As mentioned earlier, Steffek’s theory (2010), that this thesis seeks to test, has the interplay 
between international and civil society organizations in focus and it suggests that the 
cooperation between international organizations (IOs) and CSOs is majorly affected by the 
policy sector that they work in. His research relies on the documentary evidence and semi-
structured interviews with the officials of 32 international organizations. He looks at the data 
regarding the conditions of access that CSOs have to the policy-making process of 
international organizations, two major elements of which are recognition and consultation. 
The research studies different types of CSOs accreditation and registration in the IOs’ 
networks and examines a range of consultations that IOs organize to extend CSOs’ 
involvement in their activity.  
 
Having carried out the study, Steffek claims that the level of cooperation between 
international organizations and CSOs is explained by the policy field that the actors are active 
in. To be more precise, it is the sensitivity of the policy sector and the utility of CSOs to 
partners that determine how closely these actors will cooperate, whether they fund CSOs and 
to what extent they invite CSOs to participate in the decision-making process.  
 
Thus, Steffek states that IOs engaged in human rights protection presumably have a high need 
for outside assistance in setting their agenda. It is justified by the fact that human rights 
violation are dispersed phenomena that take place in local contexts all over the world, and 
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while IOs are limited in staff, they need CSOs assistance in uncovering and combatting these 
issues in all areas of the globe simultaneously. Moreover, member states have reasons to be 
reluctant to transmit such sensitive data to the IOs, thus deeming independent CSOs expertise 
more valuable. These reasons make IOs more likely to financially support the existence of 
CSOs in this sector. One of the most prominent examples, confirming this presumption, is 
represented by the position, taken by Amnesty International, one of the largest civil society 
actors combatting for human rights worldwide. It explicitly points out that it “neither seeks 
nor accepts any funds for human rights research from governments or political parties”4, 
while the European Commission’s contribution to this organization constituted £259 000 in 
20075. 
 
Steffek expects a similar pattern to be observed in the environmental politics. Its agenda 
needs to be frequently transformed, as new scientific discoveries in this field occur regularly. 
These discoveries are made outside the IO bureaucracy and the governmental apparatus of 
member states; therefore, these actors need CSOs issue-specific expertise, knowledge and 
resources.   
 
According to this theory, the opposite situation seems to prevail in those areas in which states 
have particularly high stakes and domestically remain central players, such as security and 
finance. As state struggles to behold its autonomy and control in these fields, there seem to be 
very few incentives for policy-makers to open such policy fields to the insight and influence 
of CSOs.  
 
The following table, based on the principles of Steffek’s theory, was recreated to visually 
demonstrate the level of sensitivity and CSOs utility in four policy sectors: environmental 
politics, human rights protection, security and finance. Steffek (2010) formulated four 
activities, in which IOs might need civil society groups’ help, such as 1) to identify the 
problems in the respective sector; 2) to gather expertise on the relevant issues of this sector; 3) 
to implement the policy; 4) to monitor its success.  
 
                                                     
4 Amnesty International, Finances and Pay, 2018. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/about-
us/how-were-run/finances-and-pay/ 
5 NGO-monitor. Available at: https://www.ngo-
monitor.org/reports/breaking_its_own_rules_amnesty_s_gov_t_funding_and_researcher_bias/ 
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Table 1. Policy fields and the level of CSOs utility to international organizations segregated 
into four separate areas where civil society organizations’ contribution might be deemed 
useful, reproduced from Steffek (2010, p.73)6. 
 
Resource 
policy field 
Identification 
of problems 
Policy-
relevant 
expertise 
Implementation 
capacity 
Monitoring of 
success 
Environmental 
politics 
High High Low High 
Justice and 
Human rights 
protection 
High Low Low High 
Security Low Low Low Low 
Finance Low High Low Low 
 
This table demonstrates that, according to Steffek’s theory, in the environmental and human 
rights sectors IOs need CSOs to assist them in identifying the most relevant issues and to 
monitor the implementation of policies. In the meanwhile, in the security sector IOs seem to 
prefer to manage without any involvement from CSOs. The similar pattern can be observed in 
the finance sector, although Steffek claims that in the financial as well as environmental 
politics IOs are more likely to need CSOs expertise on the relevant issues7.  
 
Remarkably, within all of the mentioned sectors IOs are not expected to request CSOs 
assistance in the implementation of policy, as Steffek’s study of consultations, meetings and 
workshops of IOs and CSOs demonstrates. According to the theory, it might be explained by 
the fact that CSOs by their nature do not have much authority to implement policies, which on 
the large scale remains the sphere of government and intergovernmental organizations.      
 
                                                     
6 Steffek, J. (2010). Explaining patterns of transnational participation: The role of policy fields. In 
Transnational Actors in Global Governance (pp. 67-87). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
7 However, it needs to be mentioned that to examine the finance sector Steffek chose the IMF among 
others, which, as he mentions himself, is rather unique in establishing regular cooperation with CSOs, 
e.g. through The Civil Society Policy Forum; thus, this outcome should be treated with caution.   
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Overall, this framework demonstrates that IOs are in need of CSOs’ expertise and personnel 
within environmental and human rights policy fields, while they are more reserved from the 
cooperation within security and finance.  
 
These findings are crucial to understanding the complex nature of CSOs as participants of 
policy-making. The most significant limitation of Steffek’s research is that it puts 
international organizations as CSOs’ cooperation partners and donors in focus. This thesis, 
however, aspires to address this limitation by examining government as the financial source 
that supports CSO activity. And while Steffek’s utility model, which assesses how CSOs 
might deem useful to their partners, is useful and highly plausible, the sensitivity of the 
sectors from government perspective varies greatly, a topic examined and conceptualized 
further in the next section. 
 
Analytical framework 
This section draws on the previous research, that studies CSOs funding sources in different 
fields, to analyze what factors that define policy sectors can affect government funding. Based 
on this summary, the comprehensive conceptualization of policy sectors is made. It enables to 
examine how Steffek’s model of policy sector assessment, discussed earlier, can be 
interpreted from government perspective.  
 
The conceptualization of policy sectors 
In order to define how the sector sensitivity can be assessed from government perspective, I 
address the existing literature that examines the CSOs-government interplay and the role of 
CSOs funding from national institutions in different policy sectors.  
 
To begin with, scholars generally expect some sort of dependency between CSOs’ area of 
interest, their ambition regarding advocacy and lobby participation and the structure of their 
funding sources (Anheier and Salamon, 2006; Child and Gronbjerg, 2007; Stroup and Murdie, 
2012). To be more precise, those organizations that wish to engage in more radical political 
activities in “justice”, “human rights” and “political opposition” policy sectors tend to avoid 
government funding, fearing that it will limit, control or delegitimize them, especially in the 
countries with flawed democracies (Ebrahim, 2003; Ostrander et al., 2005). However, in 
stronger democracies or “wealthier countries” the threat of abuse is much less relevant, 
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although CSOs there also risk the “co-optation and goal deflection” by their donors to some 
extent (Najam, 2000; Ebrahim, 2003).  Thus, the research claims that the level of democracy 
in the country largely determines civil society’s willingness to engage into close cooperation 
with national institutions and becoming reliant on their funding.  
 
Environmental, human rights, and social justice organizations might avoid any links to 
government so that they can maintain their autonomy and credibility as official policy critics, 
especially if the country performs poorly in a given sector (Wells, 2001). As the 
environmental and animal-related fields are significantly influenced by powerful industry 
interests and government regulations, civil society activists might tend to lean more towards 
cooperation with other non-governmental actors, if the government is reluctant to take action 
on the environmental agenda (Cable and Benson, 1993; Mertig et al., 2002; Child and 
Gronbjerg, 2007). In other words, if a country performs poorly in these sectors, civil society 
actors generally have more incentives to abstain from cooperating with national institutions or 
from receiving government funds in order to remain autonomous and critical to the official 
policy. 
 
On the contrary, humanitarian, health and youth organizations are unable to act without large, 
reliable funding sources, which makes them more likely to avoid confrontation with state and 
seek more government funds (Mosley, 2011). It implies that organizations in the humanitarian 
aid and health policy sectors are generally not likely to confront their state and tend to be 
significantly more reliant on government funding in order to be able to conduct their work.  
 
To sum up, the previous research on the features of government funding claims that in certain 
policy sectors CSOs are more likely to confront the state, especially if it performs poorly in a 
given sector or if it is not highly democratic. This potential confrontation contributes to the 
increased sensitivity of the sector from the government perspective, which in its turn defines 
the likelihood of CSOs reliance on government funding in this field. It signifies that CSOs in 
environment or justice sector will be more or less reliant on the funding from national 
institutions, depending on how well the state tackles environmental issues and how 
democratic the state is. On the other hand, in humanitarian sector, where organizations are 
considerably less likely to confront the state and are more dependent on it, the low sensitivity 
of the sector is likely to give governments more incentives to support CSOs financially.  
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The sector-assessment model 
Combining these findings with the definition of CSOs utility to the donors, articulated by 
Steffek (see “Theory” discussions and Table 1), this thesis builds the following model that 
assesses the CSOs utility to governments in a certain sector and this sector’s level of 
sensitivity from government perspective.  
 
According to Steffek’s theory, the assessment of sector sensitivity and CSOs utility to donors 
in this sector, allows to make assumptions about the likelihood of CSOs reliance on 
government funding. Thus, if the sector is highly sensitive to governments and they do not 
deem CSOs as particularly useful for the identification of problems and policy-
implementation in this sector, it is very unlikely that CSO will receive significant amounts of 
government funding, as in the case of finance and security sector. On the other hand, if the 
sector is sensitive but CSOs might serve an essential tool in expertise and policy-
implementation, the amount of government funding to CSOs will largely depend on the level 
of their country’s democracy (as discussed in literature, summoned above). Strong 
democracies are more likely to cooperate with civil society in sensitive fields than other 
countries, that are more restrained from self-criticism and are more willing to retain their 
dominance in sensitive issues. The presumption is that it is likely to observe this situation in 
the environment and justice policy fields. Finally, if the sector is not particularly sensitive to 
governments and CSOs assistance is highly required, the likelihood of such CSOs to be more 
reliant on government funding increases, as in the humanitarian aid and youth sectors.  
 
The latter indicator is essential to this research, as in its empirical part below the likelihood of 
CSOs reliance on government funding (expressed in percent share of total budget) will 
represent a dependent variable. Its variation will help to establish whether such factors as the 
level of democracy in the country and its performance in the given sector (that determine 
sector sensitivity) indeed produce any significant impact on the CSOs government share of 
funding.  
 
In the model, presented in Table 2, we thus include:  
• policy field (environment, justice and fundamental rights, security, finance, 
humanitarian aid, youth) that a CSO is active in; 
• CSO’s utility to donors in this field (as assessed by Steffek); 
 
 
23 
 
• sensitivity of the policy field to the government (as discussed above); 
• likelihood of CSOs reliance on government funding (as % of total budget). As 
discussed above, the previous research claims that in the environment and justice 
sectors the sensitivity of the field and, hence, the government willingness to fund 
CSOs is affected by the level of democracy in the country and its performance in this 
area. The likelihood of CSOs reliance on government funding in these two sectors is 
thus assessed separately for strong and flawed democracies. Additionally, the analyses 
also examine if environmental CSOs operating in countries that perform well in the 
environmental sector receive more government funding than those operating in 
countries with comparatively poor environmental performance. 
  
Table 2. The assessment of CSOs utility to governments in six policy sectors and the level of 
their sensitivity. Based on these two factors, the likelihood of CSOs reliance on government 
funding (as percent of total budget) is assessed in each sector. 
 
Policy sector 
 
Utility 
 
Sensitivity 
Likelihood of CSOs reliance 
on government funding (as % 
of total budget) 
Strong 
democracies 
Flawed 
democracies 
Environment High High Likely Unlikely 
Justice and 
Fundamental Rights 
High High Likely Unlikely 
Security Low High Unlikely 
Finance Low High Unlikely 
Humanitarian Aid High Low Likely 
Youth High Low Likely 
*Note: Levels of democracy is the key parameter that affects the sensitivity of some policy sectors in 
different national settings. In the area of the environment, however, country’s performance in tackling 
environmental issues also affects the sensitivity of the field and will be additionally controlled for in the 
empirical part of the research.  
 
As demonstrated in the table, if CSOs are not perceived as useful by governments and the 
sensitivity of the policy sector is high (sector and finance), there will be few incentives for 
governments to cooperate with and provide funding to civil society in these sectors, and thus 
the likelihood of CSOs reliance on government funding is likely to be rather low. On the other 
hand, if CSOs are potentially deemed useful by governments, e.g. during the natural 
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catastrophes and humanitarian crises or in work with local youth clubs and associations, and 
the sensitivity of the field is not particularly high, a more considerable share of government 
funding is likely to be expected by CSOs.  
 
Finally, a slightly more complicated pattern is observed in those policy sectors, where 
sensitivity is high but CSOs contribution is valuable and needed by governments 
(environment and justice). According to the proposed model, strong democracies are likely to 
prefer to openly recognize the problem and open a dialogue with civil society in order to 
resolve the sensitive issue. Meanwhile, flawed democracies, or countries with undemocratic 
political development, are likely to prioritize preserving the monopoly over sensitive 
information and their dominance over the decision-making in the controversial policy areas. 
Thus, the probability of CSOs receiving a lot of government funding in these sectors is rather 
low.   
 
Research design 
This paper thus aims to examine how policy sectors explain the variances in the share of 
government funding of CSOs. The European Transparency Register, a unique database 
containing financial information on CSOs funding sources and open to public, provides the 
data for this research.  
 
Aim and hypothesis 
This section presents the research question, aim and hypothesis of this research. 
 
The research attempts to answer the following question: how can the sensitivity of the policy 
field that a CSO is active in can be assessed from government perspective and what affect 
does it produce on CSOs government share of funding?   
 
The aim of this research is thus to examine whether certain factors (country’s performance on 
democracy and policy issue) affect the sensitivity of a policy field and thus produce an impact 
on CSOs government share of funding.  
 
Thus, this paper presents the following hypothesis:  
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H: Policy sectors have different levels of sensitivity to governments, which affects/determines 
the share of government funding in CSOs budgets. 
 
Data 
Decisions taken by the EU administration affect millions of European citizens, therefore the 
decision-making process should be transparent to allow for proper scrutiny and greater 
accountability of the EU-institutions. As the EU cooperates with the large number of different 
groups and organizations, it strives to achieve transparency about what groups it interacts 
with. To fulfil this aim, the European transparency register was created.  
 
It contains information about each organization, group or institution that works with the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. 3 787 of the registered non-
governmental organizations are included in this research, based on the policy sector that they 
are active in. The first (and yet only) research, conducted with the help of the ETR, dates to 
2012, when the quantity of the registered non-governmental organizations was only half of 
those registered today8. This demonstrates the increased number of NGOs, that have been 
established since then, but it also shows the increasing interest and importance of the ETR for 
those NGOs that aim to influence the EU policies. It also adds value to this research, that thus 
has potential to be unique, relevant and up-to-date.  
 
The ETR is rather thorough in defining what fits in the frames of non-governmental 
organizations. It specifies that this subsection includes non-governmental organizations, 
platforms, networks, ad-hoc coalitions, temporary structures and other similar organizations. 
The Transparency Register Implementing Guidelines clarifies that by non-governmental 
organizations it implies “not-for-profit organizations (with or without legal status), which are 
independent of public authorities or commercial organizations, which includes foundations, 
charities, etc.” It underlines the non-commercial nature of such organizations by warning that 
if the applicants’ mission includes substantial profit-making activities, they must be registered 
in another section (Section II “II - In-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional 
associations”).   
                                                     
8 ETR: Statistics for the Transparency Register. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/statistics.do?locale=en&action=prepareVi
ew 
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Upon registration, the parties are expected to provide information, divided in the following 
sectors9:  
• Registrant (name of the organization); 
• Section of registration (in the scope of this research it is limited to III – Non-
governmental organizations); 
• Fields of interests (see Appendix 2);  
• Home country (where organization is registered);  
• Countries of operation;  
• Financial data (total budget, public financing, funding from the EU institutions, from 
national sources, donations, contributions from members). 
 
Registration in this database is voluntary10. However, in practice, it implies that any 
stakeholder that seeks access to these EU institutions and their representatives must register in 
this database, declaring who they are, what their mission is and what their budget consists of. 
Therefore, for those organizations that aim to participate in shaping and modifying the EU 
policies, the incentives to be in this register are very strong, and the detailed data provision is 
mandatory.  
 
Parties that wish to gain access to the European Parliament and register in the ETR, are 
required to sign the Code of Conduct. By signing the Conduct and agreeing to its terms, the 
organizations oblige to ensure that all the entries are complete, up-to-date and accurate, which 
is regularly monitored by the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat (JTRS). In case of 
incompliance with the agreement, the JTRS has the right to temporarily suspend or remove 
the organization from the register (ETR: Annex IV “Procedures for Alerts & Complaints”). 
This regulatory mechanism gives groups and associations another incentive to be accurate and 
transparent with the information they provide.  
                                                     
9 The list of sectors in the online version of the database is slightly more extensive but I have excluded 
those fields that contain non-quantifiable data and/or are irrelevant to this research. Full list is 
displayed in Appendix 1.  
10 In 2016 the European Commission conducted a public consultation and made a proposal in 2017 to 
make the registration in the ETR mandatory for all three EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, 
Council). The discussions are still in progress, however, an initiative on such a high level gives 
grounds to add value to this database and the information it contains. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3182_en.htm 
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To sum up, the following advantages of the ETR as the database for this academic research 
can be drawn. First, strong incentives for organizations to register in the ETR database, 
supported by its practical necessity (to gain access to the European Parliament). Secondly, 
strong incentives for the registered organizations to provide accurate and up-to-date 
information, otherwise they lose the opportunity to participate in the EU-policy shaping. 
Finally, compared to another two established data sources - UIA’s Yearbook of International 
Organizations11 and the United Nation’s iCSO data set12 – the ETR provides more complete 
and consistent data. Moreover, it is currently the only source of the extended financial data on 
the non-governmental organizations existing today and open to public.  
 
However, this dataset also has its limitations for the further research. Firstly, all data is self-
reported, which leaves a room for the concealed information or misinterpretation of the 
questions asked on the application stage. Lack of control over data quality might be the 
reasons for the reliability issue (Saunders, 2009). JTRS attempts to control for such errors by 
thoroughly monitoring the information provided by applicants, but we still need to account for 
a certain degree of inaccuracy and bias. Secondly, those organizations that do not actively 
operate on the EU-level and in partnership with the EU-institutions are not included in the 
register, therefore our data is limited to those NGOs that have EU policy level in their 
interests. It might potentially give concerns to the appropriateness of the data and the validity 
of the research (Denscombe, 2007). In that regard, we need to take precautions when 
generalizing the outcome of our results. Finally, the last reliability issue that might arise is the 
fact that data sources for all variables in this research are secondary and data were not 
collected explicitly for the purpose of this research.  
 
Nevertheless, the employed data sources are all internationally recognized, and their 
databases are available online, in case one wishes to control for its accuracy. Despite 
limitations of the data, this research profits from its originality and uniqueness, as financial 
data on NGOs has never been collected before on the similar scale and with open access to 
public. In addition to that, the research benefits from the large number of cases – 3787, that 
                                                     
11 Union of International Associations, the Yearbook of International Organizations. Available at: 
https://uia.org/yearbook 
12 United Nations Civil Society Participation – The integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) 
System. Available at: http://esango.un.org/ 
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enables to conduct a large-N analysis, aspiring to encompass as many organizations as 
possible throughout policy sectors and countries (for year 2016). It is a strong advantage, as 
the larger number of cases reduces bias in the estimates and makes the generalization of 
results more reliable.    
 
Due to the specificity of the database, however, of all range of CSOs the thesis is limited to 
test NGOs performance. I acknowledge that these two definitions are not fully 
interchangeable but as “civil society organization” is a broader term, encompassing all the 
organizations and associations that exist outside of the state and the market (Carothers, 1999), 
including NGOs, I justify this substitution.  
 
This study adopts a definition of an NGO, formulated in the ETR for the organizations that 
want to register there, according to which NGOs are formal non-profit organizations, 
including associations, charities, foundations, and civil society organizations. This definition 
is consistent with the literature (Tallberg et al., 2013; Pallas and Uhlin, 2014).   
 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
The European Transparency Register contains financial information on the organizations that 
includes their total budget and the amount of funding received from national institutions, in 
form of procurements and grants from international organizations, as well as a contribution 
from members or donations. I systematized and sorted this information and created two 
indicators: total funding and government funding, containing information about how much 
funding (in euro) each organization gets in total and from national institutions respectively. I 
then figured what share (in percent) government funding constitutes from CSOs total budget. 
The following chart demonstrate what share of CSOs total funding comes from government in 
each policy sector. 
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Chart 1. Share of total funding that comes from government (%) in the respective policy 
sectors. 
 
This chart demonstrates the government share of CSOs funding in each sector respectively. 
The total amount of the funding that CSOs received from national institutions was summed in 
each sector separately. Then it was divided by the total amount of overall funding that a CSO 
has received in that sector. The chart above shows the outcome value – government share of 
CSOs funding – in percentage.  
 
In line with theoretical expectations, the two dominant policy fields, where the majority of 
government funds are allocated to, are aid and youth. As predicted by our sector-assessment 
model (Table 1), these sectors are likely to be least sensitive to governments, while at the 
same times states are likely to need CSOs’ expertise and invite them to participate in policy-
shaping in these fields. In contrast to that, security and finance are the two fields marked by 
the lowest flow of finances from the government. Again, in line with the proposed model, the 
high level of matters’ sensitivity and low CSOs’ utility in the sector, from the government 
perspective, national institutions in these sectors show considerably less willingness to 
provide funding to CSOs. Finally, in the environment and justice sector the CSOs funding 
share lies in the middle of the spectrum and needs further investigation in order for us to make 
assumptions about the impact of policy fields on it.  
 
In the empirical part of the analysis the share of government funding from the total funding of 
CSOs is treated as a dependent continuous variable. In this way, this research will establish 
whether certain factors (country’s performance on democracy and in policy issue) do indeed 
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contribute to the changes in the level of sector sensitivity, and thus correlate with the 
differences in CSOs reliance on government funding.  
 
Independent variable  
The aim of the empirical analysis is to establish whether the level of democracy in a country 
produces an influence on the government funding share that a CSO relies on. To examine 
that, the level of democracy in a country is measured by a Freedom House index (2017) and is 
treated as an independent variable. Its “Freedom in the World” report is an annual study of 
political rights and civil liberties, which assesses 209 countries and analyzes the electoral 
process, rule of law and functioning of the government. It seems the most suitable 
measurement in the frames of this study as it majorly accounts for the freedom of 
associational and organizational rights, as well as personal autonomy and individual rights13, 
which is essential for the civil society organizations’ existence and performance.  
 
It is important to note that the preliminary data observation showed that the geographic of the 
countries represented in the Register is not equally spread around the world, and many of 
them are located in the Western hemisphere. Hence, there are a lot of organizations that are 
registered in the countries with a high Freedom House (FH) score and are located closely to 
each other in the rating but that receive different amounts of government funds. A simple 
regression logic “the higher a country ranks on FH, the larger the government share of CSOs 
funding in that country” would most probably fail to reveal more nuanced patterns of 
government funding share variances when most countries have similar national settings. This 
research resolves this issue by finding the mean of FH score in the employed database (92,4) 
and dividing all CSOs on those that work in the strong democracies (above 92,4 FH score) 
and flawed democracies (below 92,4 FH score). Such relative approach will help to 
distinguish whether the countries with strong democracy are indeed more inclined on funding 
CSOs and thus on fostering civil society participation. The independent variable is therefore 
binary. Data is on a country level for year 2016.   
 
                                                     
13 Freedom House. About “Freedom in the World” (2018). Available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world 
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Control variables  
It is highly important to note that in the environment section, an additional control variable is 
presented that illustrates a country’s performance in tackling environmental issues: 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI). As “Analytical framework” section discusses 
earlier, both level of democracy and country’s performance in the sector is expected to 
explain why certain government are more cooperative with CSOs than others. EPI index 
enables us to control for this assumption. It represents a comprehensive measure of 
“countries’ performance on high-priority environmental issues” (EPI Report, 2016). The EPI 
acores are aggregated to a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 as a worst performer and 100 as the best 
score. However, in line with the proxy for government, due to the skewed selection of 
countries in our database, that leans towards democratic countries in the Western Hemisphere, 
there are many countries with the similar EPI but extremely various government funding 
share. In the case where countries under examination have very similar national settings, an 
EPI index as a continuous variable would fail to recognize the nuanced patterns of the 
correlation between a country’s environmental performance and its CSOs funding. In order to 
address this issue, as with the proxy for democracy level, we find the mean EPI score for all 
countries in the dataset (83,6) and thus create a dichotomous control variable: countries that 
are extremely good environmental performers (EPI score over 83,6) and those that perform 
worse (EPI score below 83,6). Data is on a country level for year 2016. 
 
In addition to that, we draw on the previous similar research (Child and Gronbjerg, 2007; 
Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire, 2017) and account for country’s GDP per capita, EU-
membership, as well as organization’s size (in number of employees) and its level of 
operation (sub-national, national, European and global) to reduce omitted variable bias and 
control for any other factors that might explain the change in the government funding share.  
 
GDP per capita is the measure for economic development and according to the previous 
research, societies can only move to post-materialistic values in those countries that secured 
the basic necessities and food and shelter first (Inglehart, 1981). Adding GDP per capita as a 
control variable would explain whether “richer” countries are better at prioritizing democratic 
values and supporting the strengthening civil society through funding it. Adding EU-
membership follows the similar logic. Regarding organization’s size, Child and Gronbjerg 
(2007) claim that organizations with larger staff have greater motivation to advocate and 
greater capacity to secure funding, and this control variable seeks to test this assumption. 
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Finally, it is perceived that international NGOs activity and funding is deeply interconnected 
with the national settings of NGO’s country of origin (Stroup, 2012), and this research would 
benefit from adding the organization’s level of operation as a control variable to examine 
whether it can explain a CSO’s ability to secure government funding specifically, based on 
what level it expresses its advocacy on. 
 
Method and analytical strategy 
In order to determine to what extent policy sectors explain variation in the government 
funding share, multiple OLS regression method is used. The reasons for that are the 
following: 1) it reveals a correlation level between the government funding share and the 
country’s level of democracy; 2) statistical significance test confirms whether the correlation 
is systematic or at random (Field, 2013). 
 
In the first part of the empirical test, all organizations are included in the analysis and the 
focal relationships are examined under control for country’s level of democracy as well as its 
GDP per capita, EU-membership and organization’s size and level of operation. The aim of 
this part is to a) investigate if the level of democracy produces an outcome on all CSOs, 
regardless of the policy sector, affecting their government funding share; b) examine whether 
any other factors (that are represented by the control variables) produce any significant impact 
on the share of government funds. 
 
In the second part of the research I run six separate multiple regression tests on subsamples of 
organizations for each of the six policy sectors (environment, justice, security, finance, 
humanitarian aid, and youth). The aim of this part is to examine whether, in line with the 
theoretical assumptions of this research, in environment and justice sector the level of 
democracy and country’s performance contribute to the sector sensitivity and CSOs utility to 
government and thus affect CSOs government share. As predicted by the sector-assessment 
model, we expect stronger democracies to show more willingness to fund CSOs in these 
sectors than other countries. Moreover, according to that model, due to sector sensitivity and 
CSOs utility to governments, in security and finance sector, as well as humanitarian aid and 
youth, the level of democracy and country’s performance are not expected to produce impact 
on CSOs government share. These assumptions are to be tested in six separate regression tests 
in the second part of the research.   
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Analyses / Results 
Multiple regression tests the explanatory power of main independent variable on the 
dependent variable, alongside with controlling for other effects (control variables). This 
section presents the results of the empirical analysis.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
First, the following table demonstrates the list of all variables, employed in the empirical 
analysis, with the description of their category, number, as well as mean, minimum and 
maximum values. 
Table 3. List of variables with descriptive statistics. 
Variables Category Description N Mean Min Max 
Government 
funding share 
(in %) 
Dependent 
variable 
The share of funding from 
national institutions in CSOs 
budgets (European 
Transparency Register) 
3787 13,5 0 100 
Level of 
democracy 
Independent 
variable 
Freedom House Index 3787 91,5 12 100 
EPI Control 
variable 
Environment Performance 
Index 
1091 83,4 51 91 
GDP Control 
variable 
Gross domestic product per 
capita in (The World Bank) 
3787 37520 580 168146 
EU-membership Control 
variable 
The European Union  3787 - - - 
Size Control 
variable 
Size of an organization 
expressed in the number of 
employees (European 
Transparency Register) 
3787 9 1 500 
Level of 
operation: 
-sub-national 
-national 
-European 
-global 
Control 
variable 
European Transparency 
Register 
3787 - - - 
Note: In the empirical analysis, we convert the “level of democracy” and “EPI” to dichotomous 
variables, based on whether an organization works in a country with FH and EPI above or below the 
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average. In this table, the minimum and maximum indicators are presented in order to demonstrate 
the large variation of countries with different national settings in the data. The minimum, maximum 
and mean indicators are not presented in this table for the “EU-membership” and “Level of 
operation” variables, as they are dichotomous.  
 
Before running the regressions and interpreting the results, it is tested weather the OLS 
assumptions are met. The assessment of linearity was irrelevant for this research, as main 
independent variable is binary. Correlations between all the variables are within the 
acceptable range (see Appendix 3) and additional control for multicollinearity reveal no 
values for the variance inflation factor (VIF) or tolerance (Appendix 4) (Field, 2013). 
 
Analysis 1: across all sectors 
In the first part of the analysis the thesis examines whether the level of democracy produces 
any significant impact on all CSOs government funding share, regardless of the sector. The 
results are demonstrated in the Table 4, where Model 1 shows the correlation between the 
level of democracy and share of CSOs funding that comes from national institutions, while 
Model 2 introduces addition control variables to examine whether they contribute to the 
fluctuation in government funding share. 
 
Table 4. Examination of levels of government funding in different policy sectors (OLS 
Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
Variable Model 1 
b (S.E.) 
Model 2 
b (S.E.) 
(Constant) 12.6 (.77) 11.4 (1.7) 
Level of democracy 0.92 (0.92) 1.7 (0.9) 
GDP per capita  3.5 (0.01) 
EU-membership  2 (1.1) 
Size (number of employees)  -0.01 (0.02) 
Level of operation:   
          subnational  -1.4 (1.01) 
          national  6.5 (0.9)* 
          European  -6.3 (0.9)* 
          global  0.19 (0.9) 
N / R2adj 3788 / 0.03 3788 / 0.23 
Note: *p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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The results show that in line with the theoretical assumptions, the level of democracy does not 
produce direct influence on government funding share within all aggregated policy sectors. 
However, According to Model 2, certain control variables statistically significant affect CSOs 
government funding share. To be precise, the level of organization’s operation impact how 
much government funding a CSO receive. The results demonstrate that governments are more 
likely to financially support those organizations that engage into national policy issues rather 
than all-European or global. Those organizations that operate on the national level tend to be 
6.5% more reliant on government funding than others. On the contrary, CSOs than engage 
into advocacy on the European level, tend to receive 6.3% less government funding on 
general. 
 
Analysis 2: for each respective sector 
In the second part of the empirical test I run a regression with the same dependent, 
independent and control variables for each policy field separately. I do this in order to 
examine the differential effects of factors that affect government share of CSOs budget within 
each policy field. It will allow us to examine the sensitivity claim, in other words whether 
governments are less willing to provide funding to NGOs in sensitive issues areas. The 
analyses examine whether government funding is lower when issue areas are sensitive, which 
may be due to poor governments performance in democracy or in a specific policy area. 
 
As in the first part of this empirical test, the dependent variable represents the percentage of 
government share in the total budget of CSOs. The dichotomous independent variable 
expresses whether the country where a CSO is registered is a strong democracy or a flawed 
democracy. The control variables, as in the first test, represent the GDP per capita and the 
EU-membership of CSOs’ home country, the organization’s size (expressed in the number of 
employees) and its level of cooperation (whether it acts within its own region or country, in 
the whole Europe or even globally).  
 
The results for each test are presented above, divided for the simplicity into three groups, 
where according to the theoretical model, the similar outcome is expected.  
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Environment and justice  
This section demonstrates the results of the examination of the levs of government funding in 
the environment and justice policy sector.  
 
In the first regression test for the environment sector an additional control variable is 
accounted for – country’s position on the EPI (Environmental Performance Index). As 
discussed above, the previous research claims that in the environment sector the sensitivity of 
the field and, hence, the government willingness to fund CSOs might be affected by the level 
of democracy in the country, as well as its performance in this area. In addition to the 
Freedom House index, which is a proxy for the level of democracy, the research controls for 
country’s advancement in tackling environmental issues, a proxy for which is its rating in 
Environmental Performance Index. The results for the examination of the variance in 
government funding share in environment sector are demonstrated in the following Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Examination of levels of government funding in the environment policy sector (OLS 
Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
The results demonstrate that strong democracies and good environmental performances show 
a greater willingness to fund CSOs. In strongly democratic countries the average share of 
Variable b (S.E.) 
Intercept 24.8 (10.8) 
Level of democracy 10.8 (2.3)* 
EPI 9.2 (1.7)** 
GDP per capita -1.7 (0.01) 
EU-membership 7.2 (2.2)** 
Size (number of employees) -0.002 (0.04) 
Level of operation:  
subnational -0.5 (1.7) 
          national 7.7 (1.6)** 
          European -7.3 (1.6)** 
          global 9.2 (1.7) 
N / R2adj 1091 / 0.75 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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government funding in CSOs budgets is 10.8% higher than in other states. In countries that 
perform better on environmental indicators, CSOs also tend to be more reliant on government 
funding: their government share of budget increases by 9.2%, compared to the states that 
perform worse. In addition to that, EU-countries tend to be more willing to support civil 
society on the environmental policy issues, as their CSOs receive 7.2% more funds on 
average, than CSOs, registered in the countries outside the EU.  
 
Finally, there is an evidence that supports the assumption that the level of CSOs operation 
affects their government share of funding. Environmental CSOs tackling the environment 
issues nationally have 7.7% larger government funding share, while European CSOs are 7.3% 
less reliant on the government funding. 
 
The following table represents the results of the examination of levels of government funding 
in the justice policy sector, including the regression coefficients and standard errors.  
 
Table 6. Examination of levels of government funding in the justice policy sector (OLS 
Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
 
Although the model provides a rather moderate explanation to the variance in government 
share of budget in this sector (R2adj = 0.18), the impact that the level of country’s democracy 
Variable b (S.E.) 
Intercept -6.8 (11.7) 
Level of democracy 3.6 (0.1)** 
GDP per capita -1.7 (0.01) 
EU-membership -0.4 (2.6) 
Size (number of employees) 0.07 (0.1) 
Level of operation:  
subnational -0.9 (2.3) 
          national -0.1 (2.1) 
          European -2.2 (2.1) 
          global -0.6 (2) 
N / R2adj 848 / 0.18 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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produce on its CSOs government budget share is statistically significant. CSOs in strong 
democracies tend to be 3.6% more reliant on government funding than in other countries. 
CSOs of different sizes, in EU-states and outside Europe, on different level of operations 
seem to equally rely on government funding, as these factors do not produce any significant 
impact on the variance in government budget share. 
 
Security and finance  
This section presents the examination of the levels of government funding in the security and 
finance policy sector. Table 7 presents the outcomes within the security field.   
 
Table 7. Examination of levels of government funding in the security policy sector (OLS 
Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
 
The results demonstrate that in CSOs that work with security issues, the level of operation 
explains the variation in government budget share. Security CSOs that engage in the policy 
issues within their own country are significantly more reliant on government funding than 
those organizations that operate in the whole Europe. Thus, in national security CSOs 
government share of budget tends to be 6.6% higher than in organizations that work on other 
levels. In the meanwhile, if a security organization engages in the problems that extend to the 
whole EU, it becomes 12.1% less reliant on the funding from national institutions on average.  
Variable b (S.E.) 
Intercept 18.4 (5.7) 
Level of democracy 3.3 (3.4) 
GDP per capita -6 (0.01) 
EU-membership 1.3 (3.7) 
Size (number of employees) 0.01 (0.07) 
Level of operation:  
subnational -1.02 (3.6) 
          national 6.6 (3.2)* 
          European -12.1 (3.2)** 
          global 0.9 (2.9) 
N / R2adj 127 / 0.58 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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The following table demonstrates the results of the examination of government funding levels 
in the finance policy sector.  
 
Table 8. Examination of levels of government funding in the finance policy sector (OLS 
Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
 
Regarding the finance sector, the results demonstrate that there are two factors that can 
explain the variation of the government funding share: the country’s EU-membership and the 
organization’s level of operation. Organizations in EU-members states are more likely to be 
more reliant on national institutions as a source of funding. Government share of their budgets 
is on average 12.5% higher than of the budgets of CSOs outside the EU. Finally, governments 
seem to be less likely to fund organizations which interests extend the national borders. Those 
organizations that engage in financial policy field on the scale of the whole Europe, tend to 
receive 10.7% less funding from their national institutions. 
 
Humanitarian aid and youth 
The following section shows the results of the study of government funding levels in the 
humanitarian aid and youth sectors. Table 9 presents the outcome for the policy field of 
humanitarian aid. 
Variable b (S.E.) 
Intercept 68.9 (13.4) 
Level of democracy 14.3 (3.9) 
GDP per capita 7.2 (0.01) 
EU-membership 12.5 (4.2)** 
Size (number of employees) -0.02 (0.07) 
Level of operation:  
subnational -1.8 (3.5) 
          national 7.7 (1.6) 
          European -10.7 (3.1)** 
          global 1.44 (2.8) 
N / R2adj 415 / 0.88 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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Table 9. Examination of levels of government funding in the humanitarian aid policy sector 
(OLS Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
 
In line with our theoretical expectations, the results reveal that the level of democracy cannot 
explain the variance in the government funding share as they are statistically insignificant. It 
implies that humanitarian aid CSOs in strong democracies receive equally large share of their 
funding from government as humanitarian organizations in other countries. Governments in 
the EU-member states and outside the EU demonstrate similar willingness to provide funding 
to CSOs in humanitarian sector.   
 
However, organizations that engage in humanitarian aid on the global level are more reliant 
on government funding. The government share of funding is 5% higher than in organizations 
operating on other levels, which means that government show more willingness to fund CSOs 
that tackle humanitarian issues on the scope of the whole world.  
 
The following table presents the results of the study if levels of government funding in the 
youth policy sector.  
 
Variable b (S.E.) 
Intercept 10.8 (3.4) 
Level of democracy 1.5 (0.1) 
GDP per capita -4.9 (0.01) 
EU-membership 5.7 (3.8) 
Size (number of employees) -0.05 (0.04) 
Level of operation:  
subnational -1.4 (3.1) 
          national 2.4 (2.9) 
          European 2.5 (2.6) 
          global 5.01 (2.5)* 
N / R2adj 517 / 0.19 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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Table 10. Examination of levels of government funding in the youth policy sector (OLS 
Regression coefficients and standard errors). 
 
 
In the youth sector the level of CSOs’ operation is the main factor that affects organizations’ 
government funding share. CSOs that work with youth within the borders of their own 
countries tend to have 12.6% more government funding. Meanwhile, youth organizations 
operating in the whole Europe or globally receive significantly less financial support from 
their national institutions. Thus, European youth organizations get 10.3% less government 
funding than others, and CSOs working with children and adolescents on the global level 
have 3.9% less funding from their national institutions.  
 
Results 
To sum up, in this section we have examined whether country’s performance on democracy 
and in policy area explain the variance in CSOs government funding share. In line with the 
theoretical assumptions, the results demonstrate that in the environment and justice sectors the 
sector sensitivity is largely affected by how strong the democracy is in the country, as well as 
how well it performs in tackling environmental issues. In addition to the assessment of CSOs 
utility to governments in these sectors, the conclusion to be drawn is that the likelihood of 
CSOs reliance on government funding in the environment and justice sector is more 
Variable b (S.E.) 
Intercept 1.9 (1.1) 
Level of democracy 0.1 (0.1) 
GDP per capita 4.2 (0.01) 
EU-membership 1.9 (2.9) 
Size (number of employees) -0.01 (0.03) 
Level of operation:  
subnational -2.5 (2.1) 
          national 12.6 (1.9)** 
          European -10.3 (1.9)** 
          global -3.9 (1.9)* 
N / R2adj 789 / 0.09 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEβ = Standard error of the 
coefficient. 
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considerable if a CSO’s country is a strong democracy and has significantly advanced in 
prioritizing environmental problems. Weaker democracies and “poor” environmental 
performers, on the other hand, tend to be repulsed by the high level of sector sensitivity and 
show less willingness to fund CSOs in environment and justice sector.  
 
In security and finance sector, the high level of sector sensitivity, in combination with low 
CSOs utility to governments, lead to more moderate amounts of government funds, regardless 
of country’s democratic development. In humanitarian aid and youth sector, however, the 
situation is quite contrary, as the relatively low level of sector sensitivity, in addition to the 
higher need for civil society’s assistance, contributes to CSOs higher ability to secure 
government funding, regardless of country’s democracy performance. The data, thus, 
demonstrate full consistency with the hypothesis and theoretical assumptions.  
 
In addition, the results demonstrate that for the environment, finance, security and youth 
sector the level of operation affects CSOs government funding share. Government generally 
show greater willingness to provide funding to nationally-operating CSOs, that place national 
issues of a policy sector in focus. At the same time, organizations that have extended their 
engagement to the European level, are significantly less reliant on funding from national 
institutions and are thus likely to turn to external assistance or self-funding to enable their 
advocacy and lobbying activity.  
 
Diagnostics 
A multiple regression was run to determine how much of variation in the government share of 
the total CSOs funding can be explained by the level of democracy in the country.  
 
The assessment of linearity was irrelevant for this research, as all of the independent variables 
are binary. There was independence of residuals, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 
1.962. There was no evidence of multicollinearity, as assessed by tolerance values greater 
than 0.1 (see Appendix 3 and 4) (Laerd Statistics, 2015).  
 
There were no leverage values greater than 0.2, and values for Cook's distance above 1. There 
were 121 outliers (out of 3788 cases) with standardized residuals greater than ±3 standard 
deviations, which represented CSOs, which funding consisted of government funds to 90-
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100%. However, as these outliers represent CSOs with outstandingly high percent share of 
government funding, they are essential to the research and thus, remain accounted for. They 
are unlikely to produce the distortion in results interpretation, as all types of CSOs, including 
those that are solely dependent on government finances as well as those that do not receive 
any funds from state at all, stand in focus of this research.    
 
The distribution of the residuals in Appendix 5 demonstrates that the residuals are normally 
distributed, with the standard deviation less than 1 (.998), although a certain skewness to the 
right can be observed. The skewness is caused by the outliers discussed above, that represent 
large values for the reliance on government funding, and thus drive the mean upward.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to establish whether the level of democracy, alongside with the  
country’s performance in the sector, affects the sensitivity of the sector and thus affects 
government funding to civil society. The data demonstrate full consistency with the 
hypothesis. To summarize the results and make conclusions about how policy sector affects 
CSOs reliance on government funding, the research combines the empirical evidence with the 
proposed theoretical model (Table 1 in the “Theory” section).  
 
The results demonstrate that in the sectors where government can expect some degree of 
confrontation from CSOs but need their expertise (in environment and justice sector), strong 
democracies show considerably greater willingness to provide funding to CSOs, despite the 
potential criticism that civil society might direct towards the official policy. Other countries 
with less democratic development, however, are more likely to maintain their dominance in 
the sector and abstain from the extensive financial support to the civil society organizations. 
Moreover, environmental CSOs in countries in which government performs better in tackling 
environmental issues receive more funding on average from government than organizations in 
countries with poorer environmental performance.  
 
In the sectors, where government has little incentives to invite CSOs to participate in 
resolving sensitive issues and government does not deem CSOs as particularly useful (finance 
and security), both strong and flawed democracies show equally low willingness to provide 
funding to its civil society. On the other hand, humanitarian aid and youth organizations in 
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both strong and flawed democracies are significantly more reliant on government funding, as 
national institutions value their expertise in the field and their assistance in policy 
implementation. 
 
Finally, the results show that national CSOs in environment, security and youth tend to 
receive significantly more government funding across the sectors. The conclusion to be 
derived is that governments see more incentives in funding those organizations that tackle 
certain policy issues in their own countries. They might deem CSOs’ expertise in these fields 
valuable as they partially take burden of problems identification and policy implementation 
from governments themselves. Meanwhile, it can be assumed that they abstain from funding 
international NGOs, aspiring to resolve issues abroad, and distance themselves from such 
organizations, as it might be perceived as an encroachment on the recipient country’s 
authority in these sectors. However, this is an assumption that lies outside the scope of this 
research, and the interplay between government funding and international NGOs working 
abroad is left for the future research to address.  
 
Overall, the issue of government funding and the impact that it produces on donors and civil 
society organizations have been examined in the previous research. The ambiguous 
discussions attempted to clarify whether government funding undermines or promotes the 
activity of the civil society organizations, whether supranational actors are more inclined to 
fund CSOs, whether the size, financial sources and methods that CSOs choose to advocate 
will affect its relationship with national institutions. This research addressed the gap in the 
previous discussions, where the impact of policy sectors on the structure of CSOs funding has 
been overseen.  
 
By doing that, the thesis contributes to a more profound understanding of the interplay 
between civil society and government within different sectors across various national settings. 
From the government perspective, it raises the discussion on how democratic development 
solidifies the cooperation between national institutions and civil society organizations, 
contributing to a more efficient tackling of policy issues. From the civil society perspective, 
the thesis creates incentives for a better understanding of how CSOs can secure government 
funds, or whether they would be more efficient in advocating and lobbying for certain issues, 
by choosing to rely on other forms of funding instead.  
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Further discussions could develop the understating of the relation between the government 
and civil society, by conducting more quantitative analysis, employing a more extensive and a 
more representative database that would give public access to the funding volumes and 
sources of CSOs in all countries in the world. Unfortunately, such database does not exist yet, 
and with the increasing recognition of the importance of CSOs financial transparency it is left 
to hope that it will appear in the years to come. In the meanwhile, as 80% of all organizations 
in the database, applied in this research, are registered in the EU, the results are to be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
The limitation of the research that derives from its quantitative approach is that it helps to 
reveal the patterns of the different levels of CSOs reliance on government funding, however, 
it could not extensively explain the motives that drive governments and civil society to close 
cooperation, or that create the confrontation between them. A qualitative research, for 
example conducting the interviews with government officials, that are responsible for the 
decision-making in allocating funding to CSOs, could shed more light on why certain 
governments, even in strong democracies, abstain from funding civil society under certain 
conditions and within specific policy sectors. The future research would also benefit from 
investigating the motives of CSOs reliance on different sources of funding with focus on 
different policy sectors, in order to establish whether they seek funding from government but 
face the confrontation from it, or if they deliberately choose to abstain from government 
funds. Finally, the international NGOs, that are registered in a country with one national 
setting but operate within a different national context, deserve more attention in the academia, 
considering the rising stigmatization that they experience based on their foreign financial 
sources (the examples of it happening in Venezuela, Russia and Israel are discussed in the 
“Literature Review”). Given how financial sources of an organization might undermine its 
reputation and raise questions about its altruistic and independent engagement in the policy 
issue in certain countries, it is of extreme importance to extend this discussion to contribute to 
a better understanding of the civil society autonomy.  
 
The model of policy fields assessment, proposed in this research, can further be 
complemented by the analysis of other policy sectors, not mentioned here. It gives a solid 
foundation for the academia, policy-makers and CSOs to improve their understanding of how 
funding affects civil society’s performance. Building on it, CSOs could make assumptions 
about their ability to secure government funding, while policy-makers could revise their 
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behaviour pattern in fostering civil society or undermining it. The policy-implications for 
donor bodies that support civil society around the world, derived from the results of this 
research, would be to take into thorough consideration the sector that a civil society 
organization is engaged in and the national context in the country that it operates in. The 
approach to supporting civil society where their strongly democratic governments perform 
well, or weaker democracies fail to recognize the issues, should be tailored to national 
settings.  
 
All in all, these results allow for better understating of how the cooperation between CSOs 
and their donors could be improved, benefiting to all parties, contributing to a more efficient, 
competent and potent civil society, solidifying the democratic development in the world.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The European Transparency Register. 
All information expected to be filled out by the NGOs upon their registration in the European 
Transparency Register. 
 
Profile of registrant 
Identification number in the register:  
Registration date:  
The information on this entity was last modified on:  
The date of the last annual update was:  
Next update due latest on:  
   
Registrant:  
(Organization) name: 
Acronym: 
Legal status: 
Website: 
  
Section of registration 
Section: III - Non-governmental organizations 
and more precisely: 
Non-governmental organizations, platforms and networks and similar 
 
Contact details 
Contact details of organization’s head office (including country): 
Telephone number: 
 
Person with legal responsibility 
First name, Surname: 
Position: 
Person in charge of EU relations 
First name, Surname: 
Position: 
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Goals / remit 
Goals / remit of the organization (in a free form): 
The organization’s fields of interests are (select): 
European 
global 
national 
regional/local 
 
Specific activities covered by the Register 
Main EU initiatives, policies and legislative files followed by the organization: 
Relevant policy implementation, public relations and communication activities such as 
projects, events and publications: 
Participation in EU structures and platforms  
Intergroups (European Parliament): 
Industry forums (European Parliament): 
Commission Expert Groups And Other Similar Entities (European Commission): 
Complementary information: 
 
Number of persons involved in the activities described in the box above 
Number of persons involved from the organization expressed in % of working time: 
Number of persons involved: 
Full time equivalent (FTE): 
Complementary information: 
 
Persons accredited for access to European Parliament premises. 
First name Surname Start Date End Date 
 
Fields of interest (select):  
The organization’s fields of interests are: 
all fields of interest 
Agriculture and Rural Development   
Audiovisual and Media   
Budget   
Climate Action   
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Communication   
Competition   
Consumer Affairs   
Culture   
Customs   
Development   
Economic and Financial Affairs   
Education   
Employment and Social Affairs   
Energy   
Enlargement   
Enterprise   
Environment   
External Relations   
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union 
Fisheries and Aquaculture   
Food Safety   
Foreign and Security Policy and Defence 
General and Institutional Affairs   
Home Affairs   
Humanitarian Aid   
Information Society   
Internal Market   
Justice and Fundamental Rights   
Public Health   
Regional Policy   
Research and Technology   
Sport   
Taxation   
Trade   
Trans-European Networks   
Transport   
Youth   
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Membership and affiliation 
Total number of members that are natural persons: 
Member organizations: 
The organization has members/is represented in the following country(countries): 
Membership of any associations/(con)federations/networks or other bodies: 
 
Financial data 
Financial year: 
Estimate of the annual costs related to activities covered by the register: 
Total budget: 
of which public financing: 
Most recent financial information about funding received from the EU institutions: 
Procurement: 
Grants: 
- from national sources: 
- from local/regional sources: 
from other sources: 
- donations: 
- contributions from members: 
- Statutory membership fees from member organizations: 
- revenues financiers: 
Other (financial) information provided by the organization: 
 
Code of conduct 
By its registration the organization has signed the Transparency Register Code of Conduct. 
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Appendix 2: Fields of interests self-selected by organizations in the ETR. 
 
Agriculture and Rural Development   
Audiovisual and Media   
Budget   
Climate Action   
Communication   
Competition   
Consumer Affairs   
Culture   
Customs   
Development   
Economic and Financial Affairs   
Education   
Employment and Social Affairs   
Energy   
Enlargement   
Enterprise   
Environment   
External Relations   
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union 
Fisheries and Aquaculture   
Food Safety   
Foreign and Security Policy and Defence 
General and Institutional Affairs   
Home Affairs   
Humanitarian Aid   
Information Society   
Internal Market   
Justice and Fundamental Rights   
Public Health   
Regional Policy   
Research and Technology   
Sport   
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Taxation   
Trade   
Trans-European Networks   
Transport   
Youth   
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Appendix 3: Correlations between the independent and control variables.  
 
Correlations 
 
Gov 
fundi
ng 
Sect 
Envir
onm
ent 
Sect 
Justi
ce 
Sect 
Secu
rity 
Sect 
Aid 
Sect 
Yout
h 
Free
dom 
Hou
se GDP EU Size 
subn
ation
al 
natio
nal 
Euro
pean 
glob
al 
Gov 
fundin
g 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1,00
0 
-,027 ,009 ,022 ,011 ,003 ,023 -,014 ,014 -,007 ,002 ,099 -,097 -,002 
Sig. (1-tailed) . ,050 ,289 ,090 ,244 ,435 ,077 ,191 ,203 ,332 ,453 ,000 ,000 ,454 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Sector 
Enviro
nment 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,027 1,00
0 
-,342 -,223 -,253 -,326 ,026 ,002 -,019 -,026 ,004 ,022 -,026 -,060 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,050 . ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,054 ,441 ,121 ,054 ,397 ,091 ,055 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Sector 
Justice 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,009 -,342 1,00
0 
-,188 -,214 -,276 ,003 ,019 ,000 -,012 -,020 ,011 ,028 ,000 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,289 ,000 . ,000 ,000 ,000 ,431 ,123 ,491 ,232 ,106 ,258 ,043 ,493 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Sector 
Securit
y 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,022 -,223 -,188 1,00
0 
-,139 -,180 ,003 ,021 -,018 ,014 -,019 -,035 -,005 ,101 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,090 ,000 ,000 . ,000 ,000 ,418 ,093 ,134 ,191 ,119 ,016 ,388 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Sector 
Aid 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,011 -,253 -,214 -,139 1,00
0 
-,204 -,011 ,012 -,030 ,025 -,002 -,041 -,024 ,113 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,244 ,000 ,000 ,000 . ,000 ,243 ,238 ,033 ,066 ,452 ,006 ,071 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Sector 
Youth 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,003 -,326 -,276 -,180 -,204 1,00
0 
-,029 -,046 ,051 ,022 ,031 ,013 ,027 -,086 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,435 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 . ,036 ,002 ,001 ,090 ,030 ,215 ,048 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Freedo
m 
House 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,023 ,026 ,003 ,003 -,011 -,029 1,00
0 
,349 ,106 -,101 -,140 -,104 ,077 ,063 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,077 ,054 ,431 ,418 ,243 ,036 . ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
GDP Pearson 
Correlation 
-,014 ,002 ,019 ,021 ,012 -,046 ,349 1,00
0 
-,091 -,140 -,149 -,160 ,073 ,139 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,191 ,441 ,123 ,093 ,238 ,002 ,000 . ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
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EU Pearson 
Correlation 
,014 -,019 ,000 -,018 -,030 ,051 ,106 -,091 1,00
0 
-,002 ,011 ,036 ,193 -,183 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,203 ,121 ,491 ,134 ,033 ,001 ,000 ,000 . ,440 ,250 ,013 ,000 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Size Pearson 
Correlation 
-,007 -,026 -,012 ,014 ,025 ,022 -,101 -,140 -,002 1,00
0 
,007 ,034 ,007 ,005 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,332 ,054 ,232 ,191 ,066 ,090 ,000 ,000 ,440 . ,325 ,019 ,326 ,383 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
subnati
onal 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,002 ,004 -,020 -,019 -,002 ,031 -,140 -,149 ,011 ,007 1,00
0 
,417 ,201 ,055 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,453 ,397 ,106 ,119 ,452 ,030 ,000 ,000 ,250 ,325 . ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
nation
al 
Pearson 
Correlation 
,099 ,022 ,011 -,035 -,041 ,013 -,104 -,160 ,036 ,034 ,417 1,00
0 
,132 -,083 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 ,091 ,258 ,016 ,006 ,215 ,000 ,000 ,013 ,019 ,000 . ,000 ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
Europe
an 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,097 -,026 ,028 -,005 -,024 ,027 ,077 ,073 ,193 ,007 ,201 ,132 1,00
0 
-,078 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 ,055 ,043 ,388 ,071 ,048 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,326 ,000 ,000 . ,000 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
global Pearson 
Correlation 
-,002 -,060 ,000 ,101 ,113 -,086 ,063 ,139 -,183 ,005 ,055 -,083 -,078 1,00
0 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,454 ,000 ,493 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,383 ,000 ,000 ,000 . 
N 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 
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Appendix 4: Collinearity statistics. 
 
 Tolerance VIF 
Freedom House .843 1.186 
GDP .814 1.229 
EU-membership .908 1.101 
Size .975 1.026 
subnational .773 1.293 
national .805 1.243 
European .897 1.115 
global .929 1.077 
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Appendix 5: Distribution of the residuals. 
 
 
 
 
